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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the preparations for the 2018 Men’s Football World Cup in Russia 
through the lens of neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism. Unlike many other mega-events, this 
World Cup was orchestrated by the central state, though using neoliberal rhetoric to legitimize a 
wide-ranging urban development program aimed at modernizing peripheral host cities. 
Grounded in an exploration of urban development in the host city of Volgograd, this paper 
demonstrates that the intersection of state-led development impulses, neoliberal rhetoric, and 
local needs resulted in a mega-event that emphasized a narrow form of development over more 
substantial interventions that could have benefited the host population more efficiently. To make 
sense of these developments, the paper proposes the concept of Potemkin Neoliberalism, 
exploring the various dimensions of superficiality inherent in this state-led mega-event.  
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Exploring the Russian World Cup  
I stood outside of a government building in Volgograd, Russia, hoping to meet someone in the 
Local Organizing Committee (LOC) for the 2018 Men’s Football World Cup. It had been 
relatively easy to speak with Russian organizers at the federal level – the Russia 2018 nationwide 
press secretary was responsive and helpful – but at local scales it was a different story. There had 
been no response to my emails and I had no number to call so I went in person to the 
Volgograd LOC, located within the premises of the Municipal Committee for Physical Culture 
and Sport.  
 
It was beautiful inside, a grand entryway with stone columns, but it was empty. I climbed a wide 
marble staircase, past paintings of famous Volgograd sports figures, and finally found a 
receptionist on the second floor. She showed me to the LOC offices and left me at a steel door 
with a sticker of the Russia 2018 logo. I knocked but there was no response, so I opened the 
door to find a set of empty offices, wires dangling from the ceiling and assorted computer 
equipment on the floor (Figure 1). Either they were moving in or moving out, but wherever the 
Volgograd LOC worked, it was not here. It was one year to the day before the opening of the 
World Cup.  
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Figure 1. Empty offices of the Volgograd regional local organizing committee. The sticker on the internal door 
reads, ‘I live for football’ under the Volgograd LOC logo. Source: author. 
 
This vignette hints at some of the defining features of the 2018 World Cup in Russia. Though 
the federal LOC never approved my request for credentials to visit stadium construction sites, 
they were remarkably forthcoming in providing access to high-level officials. In contrast, the 
Volgograd regional LOC was difficult to contact and opaque in their functioning. Moreover, the 
emptiness of their offices struck me as symbolic of wider processes in the organization of this 
mega-event, reminiscent of Anne-Marie Broudehoux’s (2017) thinking on Potemkinism: 
exploring beneath a superficial surface to reveal a shambolic and fraudulent interior. The notion 
of maintaining a pleasant exterior while masking an unpleasant or absent reality has its origins in 
the story of Catherine the Great’s exploratory journey to Crimea, and while the story is likely 
apocryphal, the concept has survived to explain political and economic developments worldwide 
(O’Malley 2007; Panchenko 1999). In this paper, I employ the concept of Potemkinism to 
explore the organization and articulation of the Russian World Cup, grounded in an analysis of 
urban development projects in the host city of Volgograd, located about 1000km away from 
Moscow in southwest Russia. At the same time, interrogating these dynamics through World 
Cup-driven urban development reveals a more nuanced Potemkinism that exists beyond the 
strictly visual binary of superficial surface and hidden substance.  
 
Unlike many other global mega-events, the 2018 Men’s World Cup in Russia was largely a 
project initiated and managed by the central state. This contradicts a common way of 
understanding mega-events, that is, as processes of globalized neoliberalism that rescale cities 
and states to promote urban regions over national economies (Brenner 2004; Hall 2006; John 
and McDonald 2019; Miller 2012). Though it is in danger of being misused as a catch-all term, I 
use neoliberalism here to describe a series of concrete projects (with concomitant economic, 
political, and cultural dimensions) marked by the retreat of Fordist-Keynesian models of 
distribution and the ascendance of market rationalities of competition and entrepreneurship 
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(Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2007; Hilgers 2011; Wacquant 2010). In this view, hosting 
mega-events like the World Cup is understood as part of the transition to urban 
entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989), shifting towards more competitive forms of governance 
where certain urban territories are promoted to profit from of locational advantages arising in 
the wake of globalizing capitalism (Brenner 2004; Trubina 2014).  
 
In contrast, I argue that the Russian World Cup troubles the standard conceptualization of 
neoliberal mega-events presented above, instead presenting an example of a mega-event that was 
managed from the central state but lubricated by neoliberal rhetoric of accelerated urban 
development and global competition. Traditionally, the Russian state has been viewed as a 
centralized and hierarchical structure, with the president as the fundamental figure and ultimate 
authority, dispensing decisions and authority down a chain of command from federal to regional 
and municipal levels (Sakwa 2008). This is known as the power vertical, and it is understood that, 
since taking office in 2000, president Vladimir Putin has strengthened his own power as well as 
the role of the central state, all at the expense of regional and local authorities (Ross 2003; 
Sharafutdinova 2013). This high presidential profile, however, has led many scholars, journalists, 
and other observers to use president Putin as an all-explanatory factor for almost any 
developments. This tendency was in evidence during the 2014 Sochi Olympics, where analysts 
commonly underscored the personal involvement of the president, sometimes even conflating 
Putin, the nation, and the games (Lenskyj 2014; Orttung and Zhemukhov 2017; Taras 2017). 
 
Other scholars have worked to complicate this conceptualization of the Russian power vertical, 
presenting more nuanced pictures of the domination that fails to provide effective or just 
governance (Ledyaev 2008), or explorations of the informal system of obligations that permeates 
the bureaucracy (Ledeneva 2013). Moving down the scalar ladder, scholars have also studied how 
the context of growing authoritarianism affects the conflicts and interactions between centralized 
power and relatively stable subnational institutions (Gel’man and Ryzhenkov 2011), as well as 
the systems of direct control by which senior officials personally oversee projects of state 
importance (Monaghan 2012). In line with this work, I situate my study of Volgograd first within 
an understanding of the dominance of the central state, sited in Moscow, and personified in the 
president. But I also aspire to move beyond this framing, uncovering the complexity of multiple 
intertwined interactions between federal, regional, and municipal levels of government. 
Following this, the Russian World Cup demonstrated how the planning and articulation of the 
event is neither a variegated neoliberalism, nor entirely a state-centered product. In other words, 
what at first appeared to be expressions of traditional globalized neoliberalism turned out, in the 
context of Russia’s dominant central state, to be something less easy to define. I argue that 
examining developments through the lenses of Potemkinism helps unpack these contradictory 
characteristics, and propose the notion of Potemkin Neoliberalism to help make sense of the 
ways in which this World Cup was managed by center, lubricated with neoliberal legitimations, 
and presented to various audiences in a controlled and superficial manner, while masking other 
realities underneath. 
 
The data for this paper was generated as part of a multi-year research project investigating the 
planning, articulation, and impacts of the 2018 World Cup in Russia. The project was oriented 
towards a number of peripheral cities, of which Volgograd was one, and data was generated 
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inductively, informed by constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz 2011; Thornberg and 
Charmaz 2014). Volgograd was chosen as a study site not only because it is an industrial city 
trying to reinvent itself for a post-industrial moment, but also because of its outsized role in 
Russian history and the popular memory. Formerly known as Stalingrad, this city marked the 
turning point in the Second World War and was the site of one of the bloodiest battles in human 
history – the Battle of Stalingrad, from August 23 1942 to February 2 1943 – killing close to two 
million people (Hellbeck 2015) and leaving indelible scars on the city and the nation. For the 
residents of Volgograd and the citizens of Russia overall, this battle remains a source of pride 
and a reminder of sacrifice and grief. It also obliterated most of the city and, even decades later, 
Volgograd seemed symbolically and materially inextricable from the war: the World Cup stadium 
was sited near the city’s most famous war monument, and this symbol of Russian victory also 
featured heavily in the host city’s marketing materials. Moreover, workers preparing for the 
World Cup at construction sites all around the city unearthed mangled military equipment, 
human remains, and unexploded munitions, all left over from the war (Tarasov 2018; TASS 
2014).  
 
Grounded in an ethnographic approach sensitive to local contexts and researcher positionality, I 
conducted participant observation, go-alongs, and informal, unstructured, and semi-structured 
interviews within Volgograd, the other host cities, and FIFA (Bernard 2012; Crang and Cook 
2007; Kusenbach 2017). Much of this fieldwork was informed by visual anthropology, embedded 
in an appreciation of the senses, sensual experience, and action (Pink 2006). I complemented this 
fieldwork with documents from FIFA, the Russia 2018 Organizing Committee, and Russian 
federal, regional, and municipal authorities, as well as local news and social media. Here, I 
present the results of this work in a largely autoethnographic style in order to underscore the 
crucial role of positionality, as I worked in dynamic, contingent, and inductive interplay with the 
people and places involved in the articulation of the World Cup.  
 
State origins of the bid 
In 2009, FIFA – Fédération Internationale de Football Association, the owners of the World 
Cup – opened bidding for the 2018/2022 editions of their mega-events. As opposed to the 
Olympics, which are bid for by candidate cities, World Cup bids are managed by a nation’s 
football association. In Russia, the national association is called the Russian Football Union, and 
it is deeply intertwined with the central state. In other words, the Russian state was involved 
from the start of the World Cup project, before the bid had even been won. Key players from 
within the state apparatus formed the Russia 2018 World Cup bid committee, an organization 
dedicated to convincing FIFA that Russia was the best candidate nation to host this mega-event. 
At the heart of the Russian bid committee sat Chairman Vitaly Mutko and Chief Executive 
Officer Alexey Sorokin (Borbély 2017), both of whom were in charge of the Russian Football 
Union, the governing body of Russian national football. Sorokin served as the Union’s General 
Secretary and CEO, while Mutko, as president, represented Russia as a Member Association 
within FIFA.   
 
At the same time, both men – but especially Mutko – were involved with state structures. While 
president of the Russian Football Union, Mutko also served as representative to the Federation 
Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament. Later, he was promoted to Sports Minister 
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for the Russian Federation, and performed both roles until then-president Medvedev required all 
sports federations to be led by professionals, not government officials. Mutko resigned as 
president and join the Union’s board of trustees instead (RIA Novosti 2009a; 2009b). Sorokin, 
meanwhile, had worked as a diplomat in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs before serving 
as the Moscow city government’s Deputy Director of Sport (Kominsky et al. 2018). President 
Medvedev’s attempts to separate sport and state may have been superficially successful, but this 
did not appear to apply to the World Cup bid: Mutko and Sorokin played important political 
roles in federal structures and had connections there which they leveraged to gain official 
government support (Borbély 2017). After all, the state may be dominant but it is not uniform, 
and there is a difference between working within the government and making a project an 
official aim of the government as a matter of policy.  
 
Mutko and Sorokin’s efforts at securing official government approval for the World Cup bid 
could hardly have been more successful: in 2009, Vladimir Putin (in his temporary role as prime 
minister) committed the federal government to support the World Cup bid fully. Putin put the 
central government squarely in charge of the World Cup bid by placing First Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Shuvalov in the bid committee, making the top three individuals government men 
(Gazeta.ru 2009; Russian Federal Government 2009). The 2018 World Cup Russian bid book – a 
contractually binding document – featured the total support from the highest levels of 
government as a key selling point, giving particular weight to the promises contained therein. It 
is worth reviewing some of the bid book to get a feel for the scope of government involvement 
and to understand how prominently it was promoted: 
 
“Mr. Shuvalov’s role, specifically, is to oversee the coordination between all levels of government, 
including the proposed Host Cities and regions, and across all key ministries and agencies. Those ministries 
and agencies are listed below: 
• Ministry of Sport, Tourism and Youth Policy 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Economic Development  
• Ministry of Health and Social Development 
• Ministry of Regional Development 
• Ministry of Transportation 
• Ministry of National Resources 
• Ministry of the Interior 
• Ministry of Civil Defense of Emergencies (EMERCOM) 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry of Information Technologies and Communication 
• Federal Customs Service 
• Ministry of Culture and Mass Communications 
• Ministry of Education and Science 
• Ministry of Defense 
 
This close collaboration amongst all levels of government and between departments is not unique to 
Russia’s FIFA World CupTM candidacy, and it will continue during the planning and implementation 
phases of the tournament, as well as long afterwards. Should Russia be named host of the 2018/2022 
FIFA World CupTM, an organizational structure at the highest level of the government will be put in place. 
The preparations will be supervised and coordinated under direct control of the President of Russian 
Federation… Such visibility and attention at the highest level of the Federal Government not only 
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maximizes efficiencies between organizations, but also facilitates timely delivery and quality operations. 
Such complete government support extends to each of the 13 Host Cities, whose City Councils 
unanimously have declared their unqualified commitment to Russia’s bid…”   
 (Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010, 391)  
 
Here, organizers emphasized the commitment to hosting, without reservation, at all levels of 
government. The bid guaranteed the cooperation of fifteen national ministries, mandated the 
unqualified support of every host city administration and associated councils, all of which voted 
unanimously to support the bid (itself a clear expression of the country’s authoritarian control). 
Moreover, the bid promised the personal involvement of the president himself, which certainly 
made for a convincing argument to FIFA that the World Cup would be executed without fail – 
particularly due to the perception of Russia as a centralized hierarchy under an all-powerful 
president. If the idea of the Russian power vertical could be taken at face value, then winning 
presidential approval was a sign of guaranteed success. In this way, the Russian bid promoted 
authoritarian centralization as an asset in order to convince FIFA that Russia was a safe bet. This 
was a wise strategy, as FIFA depends on the financial viability of the World Cup and must 
minimize risk for its flagship tournament. In concert with the FIFA president’s desire to access 
new markets in the east, guaranteed governmental support made the Russian bid stand out 
(Borbély 2017; Radford 2010). In its bid evaluation, FIFA repeatedly praised the guarantees, 
support, and alignment promised at all levels of Russian government (FIFA 2010).  
 
Federal players in the preparations 
The Russian World Cup was a state project even from the bidding phases, and this government 
involvement continued during the many years of preparing for the mega-event. After FIFA 
assigned hosting rights to Russia, the bid committee reconstituted itself as the Russia 2018 Local 
Organizing Committee, or LOC. Key people from the bid phase assumed new roles within the 
LOC, which grew to include representatives from national, regional, and municipal governments. 
Over time, the organizational structure saw numerous promotions, lateral moves, and other 
internal political maneuverings, but one thing remained consistent: their connections with 
government. For instance, Vitaly Mutko continued as Russian Sports Minister, Chairman of the 
federal level LOC, and member of FIFA’s executive committee, until he was banned from the 
Olympics for his role in the Sochi 2014 doping scandal (International Olympic Committee 
2017). To avoid contaminating the World Cup, Mutko resigned from the FIFA executive 
committee and from his duties as LOC chairman (Kelner 2017; Russian Federal Government 
2017). He was, however, promoted to Deputy Prime Minister, a sign that punishment at the 
international level carried little weight within Russia. Thus, one of the architects of the 2018 
World Cup was not only an influential federal minister, but during the course of the preparations 
– and regardless of international scandal – he even advanced his own career within the federal 
government.  
 
Alexey Sorokin also transferred to the LOC, beginning as CEO of the federal LOC before 
moving to the FIFA executive committee after Mutko’s ban (FIFA 2018). Similarly, Igor 
Shuvalov shifted to the federal LOC as well, continuing the synergies between government and 
mega-event since he, as Deputy Prime Minister, was also responsible for national socioeconomic 
development and financial planning (Finmarket 2012). The point here is that, no matter who 
occupied which positions, the LOC was staffed by individuals either drawn from government 
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ranks or who held dual appointments within government and the LOC. This meant that the 
LOC was built in a way that mirrored the functioning and the features of the Russian power 
vertical, as illustrated by an executive from the federal LOC who told me:  
 
“I am not worried [about the preparations]… We have personal responsibility. We know 
who is responsible for what in each city. I go to each city every 2-3 months and ask how 
things are…” (S17) 
 
These visits, where a superior federal official “asks how things are,” are crucial moments in the 
functioning of Russia’s centralized government structure. This system of personal responsibility, 
wherein figures at each level are held accountable by individuals above them in the hierarchy, is a 
feature of Russia’s power vertical and network of patron-client relationships (Fisun 2012; 
Gel’man 2015; Guliyev 2011). Though more common in the (semi)authoritarian states of the 
Global East, using this organizational system to prepare for a mega-event differs from the 
neoliberal model of mega-event planning that is more familiar in the Global North. Engineered 
largely by Peter Ueberroth in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, a neoliberal Games generally 
means private financing, widespread corporate sponsorship, and organizing committees 
composed mostly of prominent figures in the business community (Reich 1986; Wenn 2015). To 
be fair, this is an ideal type categorization and various mega-events can have greater or lesser 
neoliberal tendencies visible in their organization.  
 
In contrast, the Russian World Cup organizational structure replicated the form and functions of 
the state government and the power vertical. The president sat at the top and was surrounded by 
federal officials, dispensing decisions down the hierarchy to the federal LOC, then to the 
regional LOCs, and finally to the individual municipalities.  
 
Potemkin management  
One of the features of mega-events is the dimension of international collaboration, and the 2018 
World Cup was not solely a Russian production. FIFA needed a means to communicate with the 
LOC and monitor developments, so Russian organizers established a FIFA-LOC board, located 
in the power vertical below the level of the president and his appointed managers. The function 
of this board was to allow FIFA representatives to monitor the preparations, verify that the 
event’s organizational and infrastructural requirements were met, and issue recommendations – 
though final authority remained not with FIFA but with the Russian organizers. This board 
conducted a number of inspections during the preparations, with FIFA delegations touring the 
host cities in well-publicized visits managed by the LOC. These affairs were short and controlled, 
as FIFA inspectors were shepherded around important sites in the host cities. After one of these 
tours, a journalist explained to me: 
 
“What can you see in such a short time? Nothing. And, you know, so much is done for the 
checkmark. They’re supposed to build a certain way so they follow the rules, but it’s not done 
properly… It’s like the elevators for people with limited mobility. They exist, but they don’t work 
and no one actually uses them.” (K103) 
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These inspections – typically lasting only some hours per city, and oriented primarily around the 
stadium – exemplified the Potemkin nature of World Cup preparations, as Russian officials 
managed the visits to present an image of progress while concealing less palatable conditions. 
FIFA officials were taken to beautiful facilities that appeared to fulfill requirements, but this did 
not mean that the substance behind the polished surface was functional, just as the powered lifts 
installed on stairways were not in reality connected to electricity. Commonly, to conclude a visit, 
FIFA officials would make a cookie-cutter statement to the press praising the pace and quality of 
developments (for typical examples, see Match! 2017; TASS 2018). Notably, FIFA officials had 
little authority to dictate developments. Instead, the power vertical embodied in the LOC 
structure revealed where ultimate power actually lay, and Russian organizers merely placated 
these visiting inspectors with Potemkin presentations.  
 
The point here is to underscore the degree of state involvement – at all levels, federal, regional, 
and municipal – in the management and production of the 2018 World Cup. Understanding this 
mega-event as a centralized state project, conceived in the capital and managed down the power 
vertical into the regions and host cities, troubles the traditional academic conceptualization of 
mega-events as simply another example of globalized neoliberal restructuring, wherein 
subnational scales take precedence over the receding nation state (Hall 2006; John and 
McDonald 2019). There were discrepancies, however, between the ideal functioning of the 
power vertical, and how things actually played out during the preparations. These discrepancies 
underscore the fact that the Russian World Cup was neither a purely state project, nor a 
neoliberal exemplar, but rather something that defied easy categorization, something that existed 
beyond the limitations of the binary.  
 
Potemkin roads 
The preparations for the World Cup consisted of a series of nationwide infrastructure projects 
that aimed simultaneously to improve material conditions in Russian peripheral host cities while 
also fulfilling FIFA requirements. Infrastructure projects related to transport construction and 
renovation were the largest portion of the World Cup budget (Russian Federal Government 
2013). They were initiated from the center and then dispersed to the regions, as organizers 
within the federal LOC enacted a standardized modernization program to be implemented in 
each host city by the regional LOC. Each peripheral host city was subject to this center-led 
modernization plan, involving upgrades and new construction to sites deemed important: 
stadiums and hotels, airports and train stations, and road and rail links between these. Within 
each region this standardized plan was introduced and legitimized with neoliberal rhetoric: 
boosting investment potential and attracting foreign investment, forging public-private 
partnerships, and improving the city’s position on international ranking tables – all relatively new 
discourses for Russia, especially in the peripheries (Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz 2008; Shmulyar 
Gréen 2009).  
 
In the end, the standardized infrastructure projects manifested in area-specific ways unique to 
each host city, though all within the framework of the national plan. In other words, close 
attention to the ways in which these center-led infrastructure investments actually played out on 
the ground reveals convoluted moments where neoliberal rhetoric overlapped and conflicted 
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with centralized planning, resulting in something that defied and augmented traditional 
understandings of mega-events as processes of neoliberalization.  
 
These dynamics become clear when examining specific infrastructure projects, particularly those 
not directly tied to sport. From the start, the Russian bid book underscored the long-term value 
of these infrastructure investments, for instance in this typical snippet: “The FIFA World Cup 
will be a catalyst for the completion of infrastructure projects that will benefit the entire 
country,” (Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee 2010, vol.2, p149). Translating this into 
concrete examples, airports in every host city were expanded and upgraded to meet FIFA’s 
requirements for quality and capacity, based on maintaining sufficient throughput capacity to 
handle a World Cup stadium crowd (Kassens-Noor 2014). These requirements were 
communicated to the federal LOC, who dispersed instructions down the power vertical to the 
regional LOCs. The airport interventions within each host city came from a sort of double 
centralization, as the overall requirements were established by FIFA in Zurich, before blending 
with the imperatives of national state spatial modernization projects directed by Moscow. This 
had concrete results: by the start of the World Cup, every host city had a high capacity, 
international-quality airport, part of a centralized effort to boost the investment potential of the 
regions. 
 
At the same time, countervailing tendencies were seen in the actions of local and regional 
authorities who attempted to leverage the World Cup development program for specific 
municipal needs. For instance, within the framework of World Cup preparations, Volgograd 
authorities built a new road along the bank of the Volga River. A municipal representative 
explained: 
  
“Volgograd has a linear layout, so [a new] road will help relieve the pressure on the central auto 
thoroughfares. This will improve the transport situation significantly. Along with this, the beautification of 
the waterfront territory will make it attractive not only for drivers but also for all Volgograd residents and 
guests.” (L149)  
  
Volgograd, a long and thin city, stretches out for almost 100km alongside its namesake river. 
Before the World Cup, the city had only three major boulevards running this length, so transit 
represented a persistent challenge for urban life, and serious traffic jams were common. 
Moreover, road quality was generally poor, especially in the peripheral zones but also 
occasionally in the central areas. Referring to the lamentable roads, one resident quipped: “This 
is why the SUV is the official vehicle of Volgograd… You’ll never see an official driving around 
in a car that doesn’t have high clearance,” (D42). Because of this, road construction and 
improvement were among the most celebrated aspects of the World Cup development program. 
 
This program was an area-specific articulation of the centralized World Cup development plan, a 
local effort to differentiate the city and improve quality of life. Organizers attempted to address 
what they identified as local needs within the broader requirements of hosting., as expressed by 
this statement from the regional governor on the long-term value of the new road: 
 
“The new parallel road is important not only for the 2018 World Cup, but also for transport development, 
as well as for the development of the waterfront zone and for all of Volgograd.” (Maslova 2017) 
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Here, the governor explained World Cup developments as a transformative moment for the city 
overall. In his telling, the parallel road – which began between the new football stadium and the 
river – would improve the quality of life for all of Volgograd. The road thus became more than a 
road, instead transforming into a panacea to solve the region’s socioeconomic stagnation. 
Moreover, these investments were part of an array of similar World Cup-driven improvements, 
as the governor continued: 
 
“Residents know that the region is undergoing comprehensive work to renew essential services like 
housing and utilities. These are facilities that aren’t visible at first glance, but they raise the quality of life for 
everyone. But most importantly, this will remain as a foundation for further development.” (Maslova 2017) 
 
These “invisible improvements” included new sewer lines, electricity and gas improvements, and 
road repair. Most of this work occurred in more central neighborhoods but still had the potential 
for positive material impacts on many residents. Underlying these developments was the idea of 
making the city more attractive for investors and tourists – the familiar neoliberal argument of 
interurban competition. Adequate quality infrastructure was essential for this attractiveness, and 
the idea that subsequent benefits would trickle down to residents went unquestioned: residents’ 
lives were simply assumed to improve from the new infrastructures (a more likely scenario when 
regarding the construction of sewer lines rather than luxury hotels) and they would enjoy real 
benefits from the increased flows of tourists and capital. 
 
These tendencies were also visible in a road project connecting Volgograd’s airport to the city. 
To start, there was a standardized project in every host city to repair and expand this linkage 
from the airport to important areas in the center, primarily the football stadium and the best 
hotels. It was just as centralized as the airport improvement projects, managed by regional 
authorities, but launched and largely funded by the federal government. In Volgograd, this road 
improvement ran about 12km from the airport until it intersected with one of the city’s main 
boulevards. The federal budget funded 95% of the project, but it was administered by the 
Volgograd Oblast Ministry of Transport and Road Maintenance (Volgograd Regional 
Government 2013). A four-year project, it was scheduled to be completed six months before the 
opening of the World Cup, which allowed for potential construction delays. This so-called 
“Aviators’ Highway” project was considered as vital as the airport and the stadium, and was 
prioritized by authorities to such a degree that it was budgeted only slightly less than all other 
Volgograd region World Cup transport infrastructure projects combined. That so many of the 
city’s roads needed repair made Aviators’ Highway all the more controversial, as large swaths of 
the city in daily use by residents were in dismal condition but excluded from necessary 
improvements. 
 
Moreover, the Aviators’ Highway project itself was beset with controversy and corruption. A 
company called Dorstroyservis was the contractor for this Volgograd project, having won the 
government tender no less than three times. The first contract was annulled by the federal 
antimonopoly bureau because Dorstroyservis was the only bidder. During the second tender, the 
regional transport ministry disqualified three of the five bidders before awarding the contract 
once more to Dorstroyservis, even though its bid was highest. When critics noted that 
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Dorstroyservis had no experience in road construction, the regional transport ministry revoked 
the contract and reopened bidding. Finally, the third time around, four companies participated in 
the bid; yet once again Dorstroyservis won the tender (with a higher bid) and began work on the 
project at last (GorodGeroev 2017).  
 
Soon, cracks and potholes appeared in completed sections of the Aviators’ Highway and in other 
road projects nearby. Investigations revealed the company used substandard asphalt, violating 
regulations for thickness and quality (AIF 2017; IARegnum 2017). With a year left before the 
World Cup, Dorstroyservis halted work on Aviators’ Highway, complaining they were owed 
over 600 million rubles (USD $10 million) by the regional transport ministry (Bloknot Volgograd 
2017). Volgograd authorities placed Dorstroyservis on its list of banned companies and awarded 
the project to a different company (Pechenova 2017). Later, Prime Minister Medvedev, who had 
flown around Volgograd in a helicopter rather than risk the atrocious roads experienced during a 
previous visit, returned to the city and approved of the new Aviators’ Highway (Sheremeteva 
2017). In the meantime, most residents – who did not usually use the airport – continued along 
the same crumbling roads as before.  
 
Beyond the Potemkin wall 
In a speech to the regional LOCs, the Russian president discussed the official rationales 
underlying the World Cup infrastructure development program: 
 
“I want to bring attention to the timely and effective improvements of the host cities. I don’t mean only 
those areas where the matches will take place, but also where the teams will live and train, where fans will 
visit. I will add that this task does not only apply for the championship, naturally. The point is not to create 
shturmovshina and pokazukha. Maintaining order and making improvements is the daily work of regional and 
municipal authorities, foremost in the interests of local residents.” (Demchenko 2018) 
 
Shturmovshina refers to a Soviet work practice from the era of centralized planning, where 
workers would compensate for delays by rushing to complete targets before the end of a 
planning cycle (Mokienko and Nikitina 1998). The resulting work was often considered poor 
quality and accomplished primarily to fulfill obligations on paper – a fitting description for the 
last-minute mega-event preparations in many countries. And Pokazukha comes from the verb 
pokazat’ – ‘to show’ – and refers to the display of a superficial creation, generally for the purpose 
of deceiving a superior or an outsider. The idea of pokazukha, an artificial activity or façade that 
masks some less palatable realities, is an echo of the standard visual connotation of 
Potemkinism. Thus, speaking to regional organizers below him on the power vertical, the 
president employed both Soviet and Tsarist-era metaphors to underscore the need to accomplish 
legitimate work in proper timeframes, not only for the period of the World Cup but over the 
longer-term as well. Put another way, he did not want that nation to repeat familiar Potemkin 
practices.  
 
The president, alongside every authority figure located along the power vertical, consistently 
repeated the idea that preparing for the World Cup would bring long-term benefits to the nation. 
In this case, however, the president’s words were impossible to fulfill: this speech took place 
only six weeks before the opening of the World Cup, effectively setting an impossible goal for 
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local authorities. Unless these projects had already been completed, there was no time to 
accomplish anything of substance, and the only remaining option would be to fabricate the 
appearance of progress. In warning against Potemkin practices, the president was in actuality 
reinforcing Potemkinism. 
 
Since Potemkinism focuses on the creation of superficial, controlled, and unproblematic images 
(Broudehoux 2017), a crucial question is what exists on the flipside of the supposedly perfect 
surface. Broudehoux (2015) discovers poverty and other threats to the host city’s image 
underneath the surface, and identifies a number of strategies by which Potemkin projects 
attempt to render these dangers invisible. Many of these strategies were on display in Volgograd 
during the preparatory period. For instance, I was driving on the Aviators’ Highway from the 
airport into Volgograd proper about a year before the World Cup. On one side of the road I saw 
a glassy shopping center and a gleaming new apartment tower (Figure 2), while on the opposite 
side a row of trees obscured a high concrete wall that ran unbroken for several city blocks.  
 
Figure 2. Recently built apartment tower alongside the controlled FIFA Protocol Route, across the street from the wooden houses and 
unpaved roads of a poor district concealed by a wall and trees. The billboard shows stylized imagery representing the city, and the text 
reads, ‘Volgograd is waiting for the 2018 Football World Cup in Russia.’ Source: author. 
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When I finally discovered a way to get behind the wall, I found entire neighborhoods of old 
wooden dwellings on unmaintained roads. Periodically I saw a brick house or other recent 
construction, squashed on the same lot as an older house – an indication that some new money 
had come in – but mostly these neighborhoods had a poor, shabby feel (Figure 3). This was the 
chastny sektor, the private sector, and as the name indicates, the houses here were built on private 
land. These ramshackle neighborhoods were walking distance from the tourist center, and just a 
few minutes from a business district with high-rises towers and elite housing (Volgograd-City.ru 
2019). 
 
The chastny sektor was hidden by the high wall, and the wall was obscured by the line of trees, so 
it was impossible for the cars streaking by on the newly paved boulevard even to imagine these 
dilapidated neighborhoods. At the same time, visitors arriving to the city could not miss the 
polished towers and shopping malls on the opposite side. This is an example of the concealment 
strategy in Broudehoux’s Potemkinism, referring to how these neighborhoods were hidden from 
view and inaccessible from the main road. Further, these communities were subject to Potemkin 
strategies of symbolic erasure: a three-year media analysis revealed that none of the images 
distributed by World Cup organizers featured pictures of this hidden Volgograd, nor were these 
dirt roads and ramshackle houses discussed by organizers at any level. This is unsurprising, of 
course, as no organizers do not usually share the less palatable sides of the host cities, but this 
absence highlights how Volgograd residents – the actual people who live in there – were 
symbolically erased from the World Cup-oriented presentation of the host city.  
 
Figure 3. Typical housing in Volgograd’s so-called private sector, concealed behind a wall from gleam- ing new apartment buildings and 
glassy shopping malls. this neighborhood was walking distance from the tourist city center. the tracks shown here are functional and trams 
service the area. While cars seemed common as well, the streets were unpaved and in poor condition, with piles of uncollected refuse at the 
intersections. Source: author.  
  
 
More broadly, the city’s renovation and beautification efforts represented an amalgamation of 
numerous Potemkin strategies as well. These efforts focused primarily – though not exclusively – 
on tourist spaces, resulting in the demolition of kiosks from central boulevards, the removal of 
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banners advertisements from building façades, and the installation of large football-themed 
decorations around the city (common strategies before many mega-events, not only in Russia). 
This beautification was an attempt to craft and distribute a “flawless and consensual 
representation of the city, at once efficient, modern, disciplined, and visually appealing,” 
(Broudehoux 2015, 123). These efforts reflected Potemkinism through the obvious attempt to 
mask unappealing building facades with banners cheerfully promoting the World Cup (Figure 4). 
But there was also an element of locational Potemkinism in that certain areas of the city were 
chosen for attention, while others were kept out of sight. These uneven beautification projects 
were underscored by developments aimed at tourists and wealthier populations, such as those 
who might make use of the new airport, drive a hired car down the reconstructed highway, and 
stay in a new luxury hotel.  
 
Finally, it is important to note the varying intended audiences for these Potemkin strategies: one 
moment, it could be the federal LOC engaging Potemkinism in order to garner approval from 
FIFA inspectors, while another moment could see the regional LOC constructing artificial 
realities for visiting federal officials. Another dimension could be the Potemkinisms on display in 
order to mask the living city from visitors, and still another could be the strategies used to 
persuade the residents themselves that World Cup development exists for the betterment of all.  
 
Figure 4. World cup imagery covering a Volgograd building. From left to right, the kiosks in the fore- ground are a bakery, a florist, 
and a butcher. All were dismantled and removed as part of the urban beautification processes during the preparations for the World cup. 
Source: author.  
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Concluding a Potemkin exploration 
Urban development for the World Cup was not simply a center-led Potemkin project, nor was it 
solely a neoliberal strategy for interurban differentiation or competition. Instead, it was Potemkin 
neoliberalism: a centralized project to develop peripheral cities, legitimized with rhetoric about a 
reorientation towards international and national flows of tourists and capital. But in the host 
cities, these centralized and standardizing processes collided with local, area-specific processes 
on the ground. These processes expressed themselves in the built environment as projects that 
ignored and propagated inequalities beneath the surface or behind a wall, while focusing on the 
display of beautiful Potemkin superficiality.  
 
The convoluted urban developments in Volgograd reveal moments where centralizing and area-
specific processes clashed, generating selective material improvements with uneven results. This 
was a common pattern seen during the preparations for the World Cup: a project originated in 
the center, funded by the federal government and implemented by the federal LOC, intending to 
bring a standardizing force to the peripheral host cities. Then, each project manifested itself in 
decentralized and area-specific ways, managed by regional authorities according to local 
contingencies, and resulting in local differentiation and, in many cases, specific inequalities.  
 
For instance, the Aviators’ Highway was a poorly executed project, beset by corruption, poor 
quality, and political intrigue. Although the Aviators’ Highway was clearly in need of repair, it 
was not one of the city’s primary roads; prioritizing this linkage meant that authorities 
overlooked other roads within the city that also needed attention, and that residents needed 
more. Put another way, both FIFA requirements and Russian federal priorities spawned a 
centralized development program that resulted in preferential treatment and cascading 
inequalities. This translated into uneven developments that were neither purely state-led nor 
strictly neoliberal, but rather something in between – something that can be understood as 
expressions of Potemkinism: By prioritizing exclusive forms of narrowly targeted development 
targeted at narrow classes of people – a new river road, the Aviators’ Highway, or elite housing 
over existing neighborhoods – authorities directed attention to constructing a limited vision of 
their cities, at the expense of other, more egalitarian possibilities. Potemkinism expressed itself in 
Volgograd as a focus on relatively superficial aspects instead of more substantial projects that 
might have benefited a larger share of residents.  
 
Still standing in the doorway of the empty Volgograd LOC, it occurred to me then how symbolic 
it was that these offices were in such private disarray. I shut the door, walked down the grand 
marble staircase, and back out into the city draped in World Cup banners and flags.  
 
Literature  
Aidis, Ruta, Saul Estrin, and Tomasz Mickiewicz. 2008. “Institutions and Entrepreneurship 
Development in Russia: A Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Business Venturing, The Economics 
of Entrepreneurship, 23 (6): 656–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2008.01.005. 
AIF. 2017. “Asfalt, Ulozhenny k ChM2018 v Volgograde, Okazalsya Tonshe Normy [Asphalt Laid for 
WC2018 in Volgograd Turns out to Be Thinner than Norms Allow].” June 7, 2017. 
http://www.vlg.aif.ru/society/details/asfalt_ulozhennyy_k_chm-
2018_v_volgograde_okazalsya_tonshe_normy. 
Sven Daniel Wolfe  Potemkin Neoliberalism 
 16 
Bernard, H. Russell. 2012. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Los Angeles ; 
London: SAGE. 
Bloknot Volgograd. 2017. “V Volgograde Ostanovleny Raboty Po Podgotovke k ChM2018 [In Volgograd, 
Work Stoppage for WC2018 Preparations].” June 7, 2017. http://bloknot-volgograd.ru/news/v-
volgograde-ostanovleny-raboty-po-podgotovke-k-ch-851786. 
Borbély, Cornel. 2017. “Report on Issues Related to the Russian Bid Team.” Zurich, Switzerland: FIFA Ethics 
Committee. 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/88/06/rus_report_neutra
l.pdf. 
Brenner, Neil. 2004. New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. 1 edition. Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Brenner, Neil, and Nik Theodore. 2002. “Cities and the Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism.’” 
Antipode 34 (3): 349–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8330.00246. 
Broudehoux, Anne-Marie. 2015. “Mega-Events, Urban Image Construction, and the Politics of Exclusion.” In 
Mega-Events and Globalization, edited by Richard Gruneau and John Horne, 1:113–30. London: 
Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315752174-14. 
———. 2017. Mega-Events and Urban Image Construction: Beijing and Rio de Janeiro. 1 edition. Abingdon, 
Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Charmaz, Kathy. 2011. “Grounded Theory Methods in Social Justice Research.” In The SAGE Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 4th edition, 359–80. 
London ; Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Crang, Mike, and Ian Cook. 2007. Doing Ethnographies. London ; Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Demchenko, Natalia. 2018. “Putin Prizval Regiony Ne Ustraivat ‘Shturmovshinu i Pokazukhu’ Pered ChM 
[Putin Calls on Regions Not to Create ’Shturmovshinu and Pokazkukhu’].” RBC. May 3, 2018. 
https://www.rbc.ru/society/03/05/2018/5aeb0c6c9a7947887510070f. 
FIFA. 2010. “2018 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Russia.” 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/02/59/22/68/regulationsfwc2018russia
_short_e_v210415_neutral.pdf. 
———. 2018. “2018 FIFA World Cup Russia: LOC Management.” Www.Fifa.Com. 2018. 
https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/organisation/loc/chart. 
Finmarket. 2012. “Shuvalov Budet Kurirovat Finansovuyu Politiky, Vneshnie Svyazi i ChM2018 [Shuvalov 
Will Manage Financial Politics, Foreign Relations, and WC2018].” Finmarket.Ru. May 24, 2012. 
http://www.finmarket.ru/news.asp?id=2929828. 
Fisun, Oleksandr. 2012. “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective.” 
Democratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 2 (20): 87–96. 
Gazeta.ru. 2009. “Shuvalov Vozglavil Orgkomitet Zayavki RF Na Provedenie ChM Po Futbolu [Shuvalov 
Headed the Russian Federation’s Bidding Committe for the Football World Cup].” Газета.Ru. 
December 16, 2009. https://www.gazeta.ru/news/sport/2009/12/16/n_1436401.shtml. 
Gel’man, Vladimir. 2015. “The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia.” Post-Soviet Affairs 
32 (5): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1071014. 
Gel’man, Vladimir, and Sergei Ryzhenkov. 2011. “Local Regimes, Sub-National Governance and the ‘Power 
Vertical’ in Contemporary Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 63 (3): 449–65. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2011.557538. 
GorodGeroev. 2017. “Podgotovka k ChM-2018 v Volgograde: Gde Chudesa, Tam Malo Skladu [2018 World 
Cup Preparations in Volgograd: Miracles, but Little to Show for It].” June 22, 2017. 
http://gg34.ru/surprised/26057-podgotovka-k-chm-2018-v-volgograde-gde-chudesa-tam-malo-
skladu.html. 
Guliyev, Farid. 2011. “Personal Rule, Neopatrimonialism, and Regime Typologies: Integrating Dahlian and 
Weberian Approaches to Regime Studies.” Democratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet 
Democratization 18 (3): 575–601. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.563115. 
Sven Daniel Wolfe  Potemkin Neoliberalism 
 17 
Hall, C. Michael. 2006. “Urban Entrepreneurship, Corporate Interests and Sports Mega-Events: The Thin 
Policies of Competitiveness within the Hard Outcomes of Neoliberalism.” The Sociological Review 54 
(December): 59–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00653.x. 
Harvey, David. 1989. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance 
in Late Capitalism.” Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 71 (1): 3–17. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/490503. 
———. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hellbeck, Jochen, ed. 2015. Stalingradskaya Bitva. Svidetelstva Uchastnikov i Ochevidtsev. [The Battle of 
Stalingrad. Testimony of Participants and Witnesses]. Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie. 
Hilgers, Mathieu. 2011. “The Three Anthropological Approaches to Neoliberalism *.” International Social 
Science Journal 61: 351–64. 
IARegnum. 2017. “Dorogi Volgograda Posle Remonta Ne Dozhit Do CHM-2018 [Even after Repair, 
Volgograd Roads May Not Survive until World Cup 2018].” IA Regnum. June 6, 2017. 
https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2284745.html. 
International Olympic Committee. 2017. “IOC Suspends Russian NOC and Creates a Path for Clean Individual 
Athletes to Compete in PyeongChang 2018 under the Olympic Flag.” International Olympic 
Committee. December 5, 2017. https://www.olympic.org/news/ioc-suspends-russian-noc-and-creates-
a-path-for-clean-individual-athletes-to-compete-in-pyeongchang-2018-under-the-olympic-flag. 
John, Alistair, and Brent McDonald. 2019. “How Elite Sport Helps to Foster and Maintain a Neoliberal Culture: 
The ‘Branding’ of Melbourne, Australia.” Urban Studies, April, 0042098019830853. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098019830853. 
Kassens-Noor, Eva. 2014. “Managing Transport at the Football World Cup.” In Managing the Football World 
Cup, edited by Stephen Frawley and Daryl Adair, 149–73. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kelner, Martha. 2017. “Vitaly Mutko Steps down as Head of Russia World Cup Organising Committee.” The 
Guardian, December 27, 2017, sec. Football. 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/dec/27/vitaly-mutko-steps-down-russia-world-cup-
organising-committee. 
Kominsky, Alexey, Evgeny Markov, Andrey Panomarev, Pavel Tikhonov, Maxim Tovkaylo, and Agata 
Chachko. 2018. “Russia 2018: The 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia.” E-Book. 2018. 
http://ebook.welcome2018.com/authors. 
Kusenbach, Margarethe. 2017. “Go-Alongs.” In The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Collection, edited by 
Uwe Flick, 344–61. London ; Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Ledeneva, Alena V. 2013. Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ledyaev, Valeri. 2008. “Domination, Power and Authority in Russia: Basic Characteristics and Forms.” Journal 
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 24 (1): 17–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523270701840423. 
Lenskyj, Helen Jefferson. 2014. Sexual Diversity and the Sochi 2014 Olympics: No More Rainbows. Springer. 
Maslova, Mariya. 2017. “Vitaly Mutko o Podgotovke k ChM2018: ‘Volgogradskaya Oblast Vypolnyayet Svoy 
Obyazatelsvta’ [Vitaly Mutko about WC2018 Preparations: ’Volgograd Oblast Is Fulfilling Its 
Obligations].” July 26, 2017. https://infokam.su/n29691.html. 
Match! 2017. “Kolin Smit: "V tselom FIFA polozhitelno otsenivaet gotovnost stadionov Rossii k ChM2018 
[Colin Smith: ‘Overall, FIFA approves of the readiness of the Russian stadiums for the 2018 FIFA 
World Cup’.].” October 5, 2017. 
https://matchtv.ru/football/matchtvnews_NI786496_Kolin_Smit_V_celom_FIFA_polozhitelno_oceniv
ajet_gotovnost_stadionov_Rossii_k_ChM_2018. 
Miller, Toby. 2012. “A Distorted Playing Field: Neoliberalism and Sport through the Lens of Economic 
Citizenship.” In Sport and Neoliberalism: Politics, Consumption, and Culture, edited by Michael L. 
Silk and David L. Andrews, 23–37. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Mokienko, V.M., and T.G. Nikitina. 1998. Tolkovy Slovar Yazika Sovdepy [Dictionary of Soviet Language]. 
Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University; Folio Press. 
Sven Daniel Wolfe  Potemkin Neoliberalism 
 18 
Monaghan, Andrew. 2012. “The Vertikal: Power and Authority in Russia.” International Affairs 88 (1): 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01053.x. 
O’Malley, Lurana Donnels. 2007. “Catherine the Great’s ‘Rage Aux Proverbs.’” In Eighteenth-Century Russia: 
Society, Culture, Economy : Papers from the VII International Conference of the Study Group on 
Eighteenth-Century Russia, edited by Roger P. Bartlett and Gabriela Lehmann-Carli, 91–102. Münster: 
LIT Verlag Münster. 
Orttung, Robert W., and Sufian N. Zhemukhov. 2017. Putin’s Olympics: The Sochi Games and the Evolution of 
Twenty-First Century Russia. 1 edition. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Panchenko, Aleksandr. 1999. “‘Potemkinskie Derevni’ Kak Kulturnyi Mif [’Potemkin Villages’ as Cultural 
Myth].” In Russkaya Istoriya i Kultura: Rabota Raznikh Let [Russian History and Culture: A Work of 
Various Years], 462–75. Saint Petersburg: Yuna. http://ec-dejavu.ru/p/Potemkin_village.html. 
Pechenova, Katerina. 2017. “Expert: ‘Nedobrosovestny Podryadchik Ne Smozhet Vypolnyat Raboty v 
Regionakh’ [Expert: Unscrupulous Contractor Cannot Complete Work in the Regions].” July 19, 2017. 
http://vv-34.ru/yekspert-nedobrosovestnyi-podrjadchik-ne-smozhet-vypolnjat-remontnye-raboty-v-
regionah.html. 
Pink, Sarah. 2006. The Future of Visual Anthropology: Engaging the Senses. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: 
Taylor & Francis. 
Radford, Paul. 2010. “Russia, Qatar Take World Cup to New Lands.” Reuters, December 3, 2010. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-world/russia-and-qatar-take-world-cup-to-new-lands-
idUKTRE6AT5V320101203. 
Reich, Kenneth. 1986. Making It Happen: Peter Ueberroth and the 1984 Olympics. Santa Barbara, Calif: Capra 
Pr. 
RIA Novosti. 2009a. “Medvedev: Sportfederatsii dolzhni vozglavit professionali [Medvedev: Sport Federations 
must be run by professionals].” RIA Novosti. October 23, 2009. 
https://ria.ru/20091023/190289721.html. 
———. 2009b. “Mutko ushol v otstavku i stal predsedatelem popechitelskogo soveta RFS [Mutko resigns and 
becomes representative of board of trustees of the Russian Football Union].” RIA Novosti. November 
24, 2009. https://ria.ru/20091124/195280734.html. 
Ross, C. 2003. “Putin’s Federal Reforms and the Consolidation of Federalism in Russia: One Step Forward, 
Two Steps Back!” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (1): 29–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(02)00057-0. 
Russia 2018 World Cup Bid Committee. 2010. “Ready to Inspire: Russia 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup Bid 
Book.” Moscow: House of Football, Narodnaya St. 7. 
Russian Federal Government. 2009. “Rasporyazhenie Ot 9 Okyabrya 2009 g. N-1469-p [Decree N-1469-R from 
October 9 2009].” October 9, 2009. http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102166368&rdk=0. 
———. 2013. “Pravitelstvo Rossiskoi Federatsii Postanovlenie Ot 20 Iuniya 2013 N518. O Programme 
Podgotovki k Provedeniu v 2018 Godu v Rossiskoi Federatsii Chempionata Mira Po Futbolu [Decree 
of the Russian Federal Government N518 from June 20 2013. Preparatory Program for the 2018 
Football World Cup in the Russian Federation - 2013 Edition].” June 20, 2013. 
http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102166368&rdk=0. 
———. 2017. “Rasporyazhenie Ot 30 Dekabrya 2017 g. N-3004-p [Decree N-3004-R from December 2017].” 
December 17, 2017. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201801040039. 
Sakwa, Richard. 2008. Russian Politics and Society. 4th edition. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. 2013. “Gestalt Switch in Russian Federalism: The Decline in Regional Power under 
Putin.” Comparative Politics 45 (3): 357–76. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041512X13815255435013. 
Sheremeteva, Inna. 2017. “V Volgograde Dmitriyu Medvedevu pokazhut objetky k ChM2018 [In Volgograd, 
Dmitry Medvedev will be shown WC2018 facilities].” KP.RU. August 8, 2017. 
https://www.volgograd.kp.ru/online/news/2831360/. 
Shmulyar Gréen, Oksana. 2009. Entrepreneurship in Russia: Western Ideas in Russian Translation. Gothenburg 
Studies in Sociology No 40. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg. http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21128. 
Taras, Ray. 2017. “Putin’s Sochi Hubris: Righting the Ship of Sport, Wronging the Ship of State?” Sport in 
Society 20 (4): 489–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2015.1100892. 
Sven Daniel Wolfe  Potemkin Neoliberalism 
 19 
Tarasov, Andrey. 2018. “Pri stroitelstve stadiona v Volgograde nashli ostanki boytsov i sotni snaryadov 
[Soldiers’ remains and hundreds of bombs found during stadium construction in Volgograd].” 
Sports.ru. May 9, 2018. https://www.sports.ru/football/1063004942.html. 
TASS. 2014. “V Volgograde Na Meste Stroitelstva Stadiona ChM2018 Obnaruzhili Chetire Snaryada Vremyon 
VOV [In Volgograde Four WWII-Era Shells Were Found at the Stadium Construction Site].” TASS. 
November 18, 2014. https://tass.ru/sport/1580873. 
———. 2018. “FIFA Dovolna Khodom Podgotovki Stadiona ‘Volgograd Arena’ k ChM2018  [FIFA Satisfied 
with Preparations of the Volgograd Arena for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.].” March 25, 2018. 
https://worldcup2018.tass.ru/articles/5063619. 
Thornberg, Robert, and Kathy Charmaz. 2014. “Grounded Theory and Theoretical Coding.” In The SAGE 
Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis, edited by Uwe Flick, 1 edition, 153–69. Los Angeles: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 
Trubina, Elena. 2014. “Mega-Events in the Context of Capitalist Modernity: The Case of 2014 Sochi Winter 
Olympics.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 55 (6): 610–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1037780. 
Volgograd Regional Government. 2013. “Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Volgogradskoy Oblasti Ot 28 Noyabrya 
2013 No 679-P [Volgograd Oblast Decree from 28 November 2013 No 679-R].” 
http://www.minsport.gov.ru/Volgogradoblast.pdf. 
Volgograd-City.ru. 2019. “About Us. Volgograd City Co.” 2019. http://www.volgograd-city.ru/uk_onas/. 
Wacquant, Loïc. 2010. “Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity.” 
Sociological Forum 25 (2): 197–220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1573-7861.2010.01173.x. 
Wenn, Stephen R. 2015. “Peter Ueberroth’s Legacy: How the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics Changed the 
Trajectory of the Olympic Movement.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32 (1): 157–
71. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2014.958665. 
 
  
 
